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Artigliere: Privacy vs. Free Expression in Public Areas

CASE COMMENTS
PRIVACY VS. FREE EXPRESSION

IN

PUBLIC AREAS*

Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975)
Appellant Erznoznik, manager of a Jacksonville drive-in theater, was
charged with violation of a local ordinance, that prohibited the exhibition
of any motion picture displaying male or female bare buttocks, female bare
breasts, or human bare pubic areas, if such motion picture was visible from

any public street or public place.2 In a declaratory action

3

the City of Jackson-

ville established that the theater screen was visible from two public streets
and a church parking lot and that people had been observed watching films
from positions outside the theater. 4 The trial court upheld the ordinance as a
legitimate exercise of the municipality's police power and ruled that the
ordinance did not infringe on appellant's first amendment rights.5 The First
District Court of Appeal affirmed," and the Florida supreme court denied
certiorari. 7 The United States Supreme Court" reversed and HELD, the limited
*EDITOR'S NoTE: This case comment was awarded the George W. Milam Award as the
outstanding case comment submitted by a Junior Candidate in the fall 1975 quarter.
1. JACKSONVILLE, FLA., CODE §330.313 (1972), provides: "Drive-in Theaters, Films Visible
From Public Streets or Public Places. It shall be unlawful and it is hereby declared a public
nuisance for any ticket seller, ticket taker, usher, motion picture projection machine operator.
manager, owner, or any other person connected with or employed by any drive-in theater
in the City to exhibit, or aid or assist in exhibiting, any motion picture, slide, or other
exhibit in which the human male or female bare buttocks, human female bare breasts,
or human bare pubic areas are shown, if such motion picture, slide, or other exhibit is
visible from any public street or public place. Violation of this section shall be punishable
as a Class C offense."
2. The ordinance applied to any film containing nudity regardless of context and
whether or not the film was obscene. 422 U.S. at 208. "The movie, 'Class of '74,' had been
rated 'R' by the Motion Picture Association of America. An 'R' rating indicates that
youths may be admitted only when accompanied by a parent or guardian." 422 U.S. at
206 n.l. See Friedman, The Motion Picture Rating System of 1968: A Constitutional Analysis
of Self-Regulation by the Film Industry, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 185 (1973).
3. With the consent of the city prosecutor, appellant successfully moved to stay his
prosecution so that a declaratory action might be brought to test the validity of the
ordinance. 422 U.S. at 207. In Florida a person whose rights or status are affected by a
regulation or statute may obtain a declaration of his status thereunder. Such a declaration
will be made only when there is a justiciable controversy. FLA. STAT. §86.021 (1975). The
declaratory nature of the instant case permitted the Court to consider the constitutionality
of the statute both "as applied" and "on its face." 422 U.S. at 216.
4. 422 U.S. at 207.
5. id.
6. 228 So. 2d 260 (lst D.C.A. Fla. 1974). In a per curiam opinion, the district court
of appeal relied exclusively on Chemline, Inc. v. City of Grand Prairie, 364 F.2d 721 (5th
Cir. 1966), in which a similar ordinance was upheld. Contra, Cinecom Theatres Midwest
States, Inc. v. City of Fort Wayne, 473 F.2d 1297 (7th Cir. 1973).
7. 294 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 1974).
8. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. 419 U.S. 822 (1947). "A local
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privacy interest of persons on public streets cannot justify censorship on the
basis of content of otherwise protected speech. 9
Increased urbanization and industrialization in nineteenth century America
precipitated changes that inspired the famous Brandeis and Warran law review article protesting encroachment on the individual's "right to be let
alone."'1 After many years of disputing whether a constitutional right to
privacy existed at all, the tide has turned in favor of privacy rights, and
some form of the right is recognized today by an overwhelming majority of
American courts." Historically courts have hal to balance the right to privacy
against the fundamental freedoms of speech and press.' 2 Recently the "sexual
revolution" introduced the conflict between privacy and free speech interests
to the arena of sex-related communication.13 Because relaxation of sexual mores
has progressed unequally among various segments of society, sex-related expression readily accepted by some, may be shockingly offensive to others. 4
The legal status of offensive expression emerged from the quagmire of
obscenity law. Roth v. United States 5 and A Book Named "John Cleland's
ordinance is deemed a state statute for the purpose of invoking this Court's jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. §1257(2)." 422 U.S. at 207 n.3; see King Mfg. Co. v. City Council, 277
U.S. 100 (1928).
9. 422 U.S. 205 (1975). (Douglas, J., concurring- Burger, C.J., Rehnquist, & White, JJ.,
dissenting).
10. Brandeis & Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. Rav. 193 (1890). Of particular
importance to the authors was the increasing conflict between freedom of the press and the
right to privacy. Technological improvements in devices for prying into personal lives and
the means by which such matters were reported inevitably pitted the right of the public
to know against the right of individual privacy. Note, Constitutional Law- Freedom To Communicate Versus Right To Privacy: Regulation of Offensive Speech Limited by "Captive
Audience" Doctrine, 48 WASH. L. REv. 667, 668 (1973); see T. CooLEY, COOLEY ON TORTS
29 (2d ed. 1888).
11. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAuir. L. Rv. 383, 384-88 (1960). The rapidity with which
the doctrine of the right to privacy is noted in Pollet, Invasion of Privacy: The
Eye and the Ear, 8 IDAHo L. RaV. 58 (1971).
12. See Prosser, supra note 11, and authorities cited note 10 supra.
13. The phrase "right to privacy" connotes an undefinable, complex area of the law.
Dean Prosser submitted four broad types of invasion emerging from this right "to be
left alone": "I. Intrusion on the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs.
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff. 3. Publicity which
places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye. 4. Appropriation for the defendant's
advantage, of the plaintiff's name or likeness." Prosser, supra note 11, at 389. The instant
case falls into Prosser's first category. Specifically, appellee argued that the City may protect
its citizens against "unwilling exposure to materials that may be offensive." 422 U.S. at 208.
14. See Note, supra note 10, at 669.
15. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). Prior to Roth, the Court categorized obscenity as expression
outside first amendment protection. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72
(1942). As with libel and "fighting words," obscene material was thought to have such
slight social value that constitutional protection was not merited. Comment, Obscenity:
Determined by Whose Standards?, 26 U. FLA. L. Rrv. 324 (1974). Since Roth maintained
the status of obscenity as outside the aegis of the first amendment, the Court was then
presented with the difficult problem of defining obscenity. The tortuous, divided efforts
of the Court in this regard were laid out in a dissenting opinion by Justice Brennan in
Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73 (1973). See Tucker, The Law of Obscenity Where Has It Gone?, 22 U. FLA. L. R.v. 547 (1970).
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Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General's narrowly defined
obscenity," and, following these decisions, few obscenity convictions withstood appeal. 8 The Court, caught up in a maze of obscenity criteria complicated by public outcry against the increasing availability of sexually explicit
20
materials,1 9 modified its approach to obscenity in Redrup v. New York.
Instead of focusing on whether the subject matter of the materials was obscene,
the Redrup Court examined the sellers' conduct in the distribution of their
21
books and magazines.
Heralded as a "watershed" in obscenity law by legal writers,22 Redrup also
had a significant impact on the law of offensive expression, shifting the
emphasis of obscenity characterization from an evaluation of material by
prior obscenity standards"3 to a determination regarding distribution and

16. 383 US. 413 (1966).
17. Until Roth, two basic tests had been applied in judging whether material was
obscene. The earlier standard, judging obscenity by "the effect of an isolated excerpt upon
particularly susceptible persons," was established in Regina v. Hicklin [1868] L.R. 3 Q.B.
360, cited in 354 U.S. at 489. The Roth Court deemed this test "unconstitutionally restrictive,"
preferring the alternative test adopted by several American courts: "[W]hether to the average
person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material
taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest." Id. The legal definition of obscenity
under the Roth-Memoirs test was set out in Memoirs as follows: a) the dominant theme
of the material must appeal to the prurient interest in sex; b) the material must be patently
offensive in its affront to contemporary community standards; and c) the material must be
utterly without redeeming social value. 383 U.S. at 418.
18. Note, supra note 10, at 669. The Court's policy on obscenity seemed directed against
only "hard core" pornography. Note, Obscenity From Stanley to Karalexis: A Back-Door
Approach to First Amendment Protection,23 VAND. L. REv. 369, 384 (1970). For one definition
of "hard core" pornography, see the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart in Ginsburg
v. United States, 383 U.S. 463. 499 n.3 (1966), discussed in note 23 infra.
19. Note, supra note 10, at 669. Cf. Note, supra note 18, at 369; Teeter & Pember,
The Retreat From Obscenity: Redrup v. New York, 21 HASMINGS L.J. 175, 175 (1969).
20. 386 U.S. 767 (1967). Redrup was a per curiam opinion joining three cases involving
books and magazines allegedly obscene according to New York, Kentucky, and Arkansas laws.
The Court held that distribution of the publications was protected from governmental
suppression by the first and fourteenth amendments.
21. Id. at 769-70. The distribution of books and magazines will receive first amendment
protection where (1) there is no claim that the applicable statute reflects "a specific and
limited concern for juveniles"; (2) there is not an assault on individual privacy that an
unwilling victim could not avoid; (3) there is no evidence of pandering; and (4) the materials
are not hard core pornopraghy. Id.
22. Note, supra note 10, at 670. Cf. Teeter & Pember, supra note 19, at 188; Note,
supra note 18, at 383-85.
23. The Court 'seemed to be moving toward Justice Stewart's definition of obscenity in
Ginsburg v. United States, 38? U.S. 463, 499 (1966) (dissenting opinion). "Such materials
include photographs, both still and motion picture, with no pretense of artistic value,
graphically depicting acts of sexual intercourse, including various acts of sodomy, and sadism.
and sometimes involving several participants in scenes of orgy-like character. They also
include strips of drawings in comicbook format grossly depicting similar activities in an
exaggerated fashion. There are, in addition, pamphlets and booklets, sometimes with
photographic illustrations, verbally describing such activities in a bizarre manner with
no attempt whatsoever to afford portrayals of character or situation and with no pretense
to literary value. All of this material cannot conceivably be characterized as embodying
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advertising.24 Thus, Redrup indicated that one who exhibits sexually oriented
offensive material, otherwise constitutionally protected, may lose the protection if his conduct invades rather vague privacy rights of others. 25 The Redrup
26
Court cited two nonobscenity cases in support of the privacy standard.
Breard v. Alexandria27 had held that a municipal ordinance prohibiting doorto-door solicitation by peddlers was designed to protect the privacy interest
of others and did not violate freedom of the press. 28 Subsequently, Public
Utilities Commission v. Pollak29 indicated that privacy interests outside the
home merited less protection. In Pollak radio programs broadcast to a captive audience in a bus were held not to infringe on the passengers' constitutional right to privacy.30
The full significance of Redrup, regarding the impact of offensive conduct
or materials on an individual's privacy, became apparent in later decisions. 3 1
The Washington supreme court applied Redrup in State v. Rabe,2 upholding
defendant's obscenity conviction even though the material he exhibited was not

obscene under the Roth-Memoirs test. Paralleling the instant facts, Rabe involved the showing of a film2 3 containing nudity34 on a drive-in theater screen
communication of ideas or artistic values inviolate under the First Amendment." See Teeter
8- Pember, supra note 19, at 189; Note, supra note 18, at 384.
24. 386 U.S. at 769. Chief Justice Warren forecast the Court's shift in emphasis in a
concurring opinion in Roth in which he said: "It is not the book that is on trial; it is
the person. The conduct of the defendant is the central issue, not the obscenity of a book
or picture." 354 U.S. 476, 495 (1957).
25. "In none [of the cases at issue] was there any suggestion of an assault upon individual privacy by publication in a manner so obtrusive as to make it impossible for an
unwilling individual to avoid exposure to it. Cf. Breard v. Alexandra, 341 U.S. 622; Public
Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451." 386 U.S. at 769; see Teeter & Pember, supra
note 19, at 186.
26. See note 25 supra.
27. 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
28. Id. at 645.

29. 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
30. ld. at 464-65.
31. The significant impact of Redrup on obscenity litigation is described in Note, supra
note 18, at 384, 884 n.85. See generally Teeter & Pember, supra note 19. The Court further
shrugged the burden of determining factual issues regarding obscenity in Miller v.
California, in which it held that local rather than national contemporary community
standards are to be applied in defining obscenity in state statutes. 413 U.S. 15, 37 (1973).
See Comment, supra note 15, at 329.
32. 79 Wash. 2d 254, 484 P.2d 917 (1971), rev'd per curiam, 405 U.S. 313 (1972).
33. Historically motion pictures were not afforded first amendment protection. Mutual
Film Corp. v. Ohio Indus. Comm'n, 236 U.S. 280, 244-45 (1914). The Mutual Film caveat was
discarded when the Court was again squarely presented with the issue in Joseph Burstyn,
Inc. v. Wilson, 343 US. 495, 502 (1952). Burstyne noted that Mutual Film was decided 11
years before the first talking pictures were produced, and held that the film media merited
first amendment protection. Id. at 502, 503 n.12. See also Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184
(1964); Comment, Constitutional Law: Freedom of Speech in Motion Pictures, 6 U. FIA. L.

Rxv. 131 (1953).
34. Mere nudity was not sufficient to make the film obscene because "not every
portrayal of male or female nudity is obscene." Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S.
478, 490 (1962).
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visible from an adjacent highway and neighboring homes.35 The court, though
expressing doubt that the film was obscene on its face, declared that its
showing constituted "an assault upon individual privacy" of nearby residents
and motorists and was thus constitutionally obscene in that context.3
The United States Supreme Court reversed on procedural grounds,3 7 and
did not reach the issue of the constitutionality of the Washington court's attempt to make the context in which the material is displayed a determinative
element of an obscenity conviction.38 A concurring opinion by Chief Justice
Burger provided guidelines for state statutes designed to protect the public
from exposure to offensive materials. 39 The Chief Justice specifically indicated
that the "offensive display" statutes enacted in Arizona40 and New York 41 were
constitutionally sound. 42 Hence, legislatures were apparently free to reconcile
the conflicting rights of firee speech and privacy by regulating the time and
manner of expression.4

3

35. 79 Wash. 2d at 255, 484 P.2d at 919 (1971). Other cases with similar facts include,
e.g., Cinecom Theatres Midwest States, Inc. v. City of Fort Wayne, 473 F.2d 1297, 1300-03
(7th Cir. 1973) (ordinance unconstitutionally overbroad in treatment of nudity and privacy
interests involved did not outweigh free speech); Chemline v. City of Grand Prarie, 364
F.2d 721, 726 (5th Cir. 1966) (city ordinance valid as a measure protecting children); Cactus
Corp. v. State ex. rel. Murphy, 14 Ariz. App. 38, 480 P.2d 375 (1971) (film with explicit
sex scenes subject to abatement as a public nuisance).
36. 79 Wash. 2d at 267, 484 P.2d at 925 (quoting Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767,
769 (1967)). The court also held that the state obscenity statute was constitutional as
applied.
37. 405 U.S. 313, 315 (1972). The statute did not give notice that obscenity would
be determined based upon exposure to the "nonconsenting general public." See Papachristou
v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (criminal statute must be tested by
determining "whether it gives a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden."); Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223 (1951); Note, supra
note 10, at 667 n.4.
38. Id. at 667.
39. 405 U.S. at 317. Citing Redrup, the Chief Justice indicated that a state could constitutionally prohibit as a nuisance "a public display of scenes depicting explicit sexual activities
if the state undertook to do so under a statute narrowly drawn to protect the public
from potential exposure to such offensive materials."
40. ARz. REV. STAT. ANN. §13-357 (Supp. 1972-73).
41. N.Y. PENAL LAW §245.11 (McKinney Supp. 1972-73). The New York statute, similar
to the statute in the instant case, reads in part: "A person is guilty of a public display
of offensive sexual material when, with knowledge of its character and content, he displays
or permits to be displayed in or on any window, showcase, newsstand, display rack, wall,
door, billboard, display board, viewing screen, moving picture screen, marquee, or similar
place, in such a manner that the display is easily visible from or in any public street, sidewalk, or thoroughfare facility, any pictorial, three dimensional or other representation of a
person or a portion of the human body that predominantly appeals to prurient interest
in sex, and that: (a) depicts nudity, or actual or simulated sexual conduct or sado-masochistic
abuse. . . . Public display of offensive sexual material is a Class A misdemeanor."
Section 245.10 defines "nudity" as "the showing of the male or female genitals, pubic area
or buttocks with less than a full opaque covering, or the showing of the female breast with
less than a full opaque covering of any portion thereof below the top of the nipple ..
"
The New York statute was upheld in Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 634 (1968).
42. 405 U.S. 313, 317 (1972).
43. Note, supra note 10, at 673; see Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47-48 (1966); Cox
v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88 (1949). However,
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The caution with which the Court has proceeded in limiting speech in
the interest of privacy is illustrated in Cohen v. California.4 That case involved a conviction under California's "offensive conduct" statute45 for entering
a public courthouse wearing a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft." The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that, absent a compelling reason for its
actions, a state may not make such a display a criminal offense. 4 Justice
Harlan, speaking for the majority, stated that government may shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it only when "substantial
47
privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner."
The Court was concerned that a broader view would allow the silencing of
dissidents at the whim of the majority. 48 Although individuals are often
"captives" outside the home and subjected to objectionable material,4 9 the
burden is on the viewer to avoid further bombardment of his sensibilities
by simply averting his eyes, if possible.50 Thus, the measure of privacy afforded
an individual is not total isolation from offensive materials; he must merely
be able to avoid further contact with stimuli that he has experienced and
found distasteful.51 Government's role is limited to ensuring that an avenue
of escape is left open. 52
The instant decision is a logical extension of the reasoning in Cohen. The
Court recognized that a pluralistic, growing society, by its very nature, can
produce frequent encounters with matter that offends aesthetic, political, or
moral sensibilities. 53 Yet, absent certain narrow circumstances," the viewer's
only recourse is to avert his eyes. 55 There is a need for delicate balancing

government attempts to selectively shield the public from some kinds of speech on the
grounds that they are more offensive than others are limited by the first amendment. 422
U.S. at 209; see, e.g., Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). Motion pictures are distinguishable from the print media on the issue of censorship. The Court has on occasion
approved prior restraint of motion pictures. Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 49
(1961). But see Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965). Books and magazines have been
afforded greater protection. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931). But see Kingsley
Books Inc. v. Brown, 254 U.S. 436, 443-45 (1957). Cf. Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268

(1951).
44. 403 U.S, 15 (1971).
45. CAL. PENAL CODE §415 (1975).
46. 403 U.S. at 26.
47. Id. at 21.
48. Id.
49. Id. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1975); Rowan v.
United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970).
50. 403 U.S. at 21. Compare Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 (1972).
51. Note, supra note 10, at 682.
52. Haiman, Speech v. Privacy: Is There a Right Not to Be Spoken To?, 67 Nw. U.L.
Ray. 153, 195 (1972); see 403 US. at 21.
53. 422 US. at 210
54. Such circumstances include intrusion .on the sanctity of the home or a high
degree of captivity during which exposure is unavoidable. The majority distinguished the,
instant situation from a deliberate attempt to offend an unwilling audience. See Rosenfeld
v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 905 (Powell, J., dissenting). In the present case Erznoznik was
"not trying to reach, much less shock" viewers outside of his theater. 422 U.S. at 210-11 n.6.
55. The screen of a drive-in theater is not "so obtrusive as to make it impossible for
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because the interests on both sides are "plainly rooted in the traditions and
significant concerns of our society." 56 State restrictions on allegedly offensive
speech have been upheld only when the speaker invades the privacy of the
home5 7 or when the degree of captivity makes it impractical for the unwilling
viewer or auditor to avoid exposure.58
The majority also asserted that the Jacksonville ordinance discriminated
among motion pictures solely on the basis of content. Scenes of nudity in a
motion picture, like pictures of nude persons in a book, must be considered
as part of the entire work. 59 The instant ordinance would cause a restraint
on free expression by either preventing drive-in theaters from showing films
containing any nudity60 or increasing the cost of showing such films.6' After
weighing the infringement on appellant's first amendment rights against the
"limited privacy interest" of the individuals on public streets, the Court held
that the statute's discrimination on the basis of content could not be justified
as a means of preventing significant intrusions on privacy.62
Dissenting in the present case, Chief Justice Burger attacked the majority's
approach as "rigidly simplistic," asserting that a drive-in theater is a unique
visual medium that defies comparison to the jacket in Cohen6" and noting that
drive-in theater screens are designed to attract and hold the attention of all
viewers.64 Further, he contended that each case must be examined on its
merits, and that prior Court holdings indicated that every medium of communication is a "law unto itself."6 As to content discrimination, the Chief
an unwilling individual to avoid exposure to it." 422 U.S. at 212 (quoting Redrup v.
New York, 386 U.S. 767, 769 (1967)). Contra, Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105, 110 (1932).
56. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975).
57. 422 U.S. at 209; see Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 736-38
(1970).
58. 422 U.S. at 209; see Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
"Captivity" is further explored in text accompanying notes 48-52 supra.
59. 422 U.S. at 210-11, 214 n.l.
60. Id. at 211. The broad nature of such an ordinance would prevent the showing of
a film containing nudity regardless of the nature of value of the work. "Thus it would bar
a film containing a picture of a baby's buttocks, the nude body of a war victim, or scenes
from a culture in which nudity is indigenous." The overbreadth of the statues was also
fatal to the city's attempt to support the ordinance as protection for children. Id. at 211-12:
see Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844 (1970).
61. Increased cost would result from the requirement of blocking the screen from
public view. 422 U.S. at 211-12 n.8. The Court addressed two other key issues. As to the
appellee's attempt to justify the ordinance as a traffic regulation, the Court held on equal
protection and first amendment grounds that the ordinance was "strikingly underinclusive,"
and that "even a traffic regulation cannot discriminate on the basis of content unless
there are clear reasons for the distinction." Id. at 214-15. In addition, the Court rejected
appellee's attempt to support the ordinance as a proper exercise of the city's police power
to protect children and held the statute to be overbroad. The ordinance was not directed
against sexually explicit nudity, and "[c]learly all nudity cannot be deemed obscene even
as to minors." Id. at 213-14. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518-19 (1958); note 60
supra.
62. 422 U.S. at 212.
63. Id. at 220-21.
64. Id. at 221.
65. Id. at 220 (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949)).
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Justice pointed out that individuals outside the theater cannot possibly consider fragments of movies as part of the "whole work" because they see
but do not hear the performance. The communicative value of such fragmentary contact is minimal. 6 The police power authorizes a city to limit
nudity in public areas, so a play that involves genuine expression of ideas
but is performed by nude actors may be prohibited in a public park or
street. 7 The Chief Justice asserted that the same rationale should be applied
to "giant displays which through technology are capable of revealing and
emphasizing the most intimate details of human anatomy." 6 While the
assertions made by the dissent were well-reasoned, they failed to consider
changing societal values and thus are not consistent with the current trend
of decisions in this area. 69
The instant case indicates that the constitutional right of free expression
is and will continue to be of paramount interest to our society. In line with
prior decisions, the instant Court has further removed governmental restraints
from the arena of public discussion, placing the decision of what will be
seen in the hands of each of us. 70 Hopefully that freedom, which is consistent
with the premises of individual dignity and choice on which our political system
depends, will help produce a more capable citizenry and better government. 7'
The Court here furthers freedom of choice in both speaker and listener. Under
Cohen and the instant case, government may not form a "protective cocoon"
around each individual. Instead, everyone7 2 may be exposed to nonobscene
material, become aware of the message for his own peace of mind, and avoid
further contact with any stimuli that are distasteful.- 8 The Court's furtherance
of free expression was achieved at the expense of privacy interests. This is
the inevitable result of balancing, no matter how delicately done.
The ill-fated ordinance met standards apparently acceptable to the Court

66. 422 U.S. at 222-23. Chief Justice Burger noted that the same movie was exhibited
at several nearby indoor theaters, so the public was not prevented from considering the
"work as a whole." Also Erznoznik could show nonobscene films containing nudity simply
by erecting a screen around his theater.
67. Id. at 223; cf. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 67 (1973); Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 512 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
68. 422 U.S. 223. In a separate dissenting opinion Justice White approached the same
issue by saying: "The Court concludes: 'that the limited privacy interest of persons on the
public streets cannot justify this censorship of otherwise protected speech on the basis of
its content.' Ante, at 212. If this broadside is to be taken literally, the State may not forbid
'expressive' nudity on the public streets, in the public parks or any other public place
since other persons in those places at that time have a 'limited privacy interest' and may
merely look the other way. I am not ready to take this step with the Court." Id. at 224.
69. See, e.g., Papish v. Board of Curators of the Univ. of Missouri, 410 U.S. 667, 670
(1973); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Gleason v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899,
904 (6th Cir. 1975); Thoren v. Jenkins, 491 F.2d 722, 723-24 (4th Cir. 1973).
70. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).
71. Id.; see Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-77 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
72. That is, excluding the specific exceptions in note 54 supra, and children who
demand a special measure of state protection. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629
(1968).
73. Note, supra note 10, at 682.
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